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Resumo 
O objetivo do presente estudo é tentar perceber se a atividade especulativa é o fator 
principal na repentina subida de preços do crude no spot market, especialmente no mais 
recente episódio especulativo que ocorreu entre 2003 e a primeira metade de 2008. A base 
do nosso estudo assenta num modelo já existente de vectores autoregressivos que foi 
proposto por Kilian e Murphy (2014); um modelo estrutural do mercado global do crude 
que permite uma análise de choques de procura e oferta e também choques especulativos. 
A originalidade do modelo apresentado nesta dissertação, relativamente ao daqueles 
autores, reside na introdução de um componente especulativo para medir os spreads 
usando contratos de futuros do crude. Com o output do modelo estrutural apresentado 
conseguimos excluir a teoria da especulação como fator na subida do preço do crude; no 
entanto, os nossos resultados sugerem que a subida se deve a um aumento na procura 
conduzido por um crescimento económico inesperado na economia global. As conclusões 
deste estudo permitem confirmar as de outras obras literárias da mesma natureza e 
revelam a importância dos futuros enquanto instrumentos preditivos.  
 
Palavras-chave: Procura; Oferta; Especulação; Inventários; Spreads; Futuros; Crude; 
Elasticidade; Mercados Globais 
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Abstract 
The objective of the present study is to understand if speculative activity is a main factor 
in the run-up of oil prices in the spot market, especially the most recent price bubble in 
the 2003-mid 2008 period. The basis of our model is set on an existing vector 
autoregressive model proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014), a structural model of the 
global market for crude oil that allows for shocks to flow demand and flow supply as well 
as speculative demand shocks for oil. Our speculative component of the real price is set 
on the data of oil futures, which we used to construct our oil spread variable. From the 
output of our structural model we ruled out speculation as a factor of rising oil prices . 
Instead we found that rapid oil demand caused by an unexpected increase in the global 
business cycle is the most accurate culprit. The conclusions in this study confirm the 
findings of other authors in existing literature of the same nature and shed light on the  
predictive power of futures.  
 
Keywords: Demand; Supply; Speculation; Inventories; Spreads; Futures; Crude Oil; 
Elasticity; Global Markets  
 ix 
 
General Index 
 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1. Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 3 
1.1. Insight on the NYMEX and Crude Oil Futures Market ..................................... 3 
1.2. Using Oil Futures as an Indicator of Market Expectations ................................ 5 
1.2.1 Why Data on Oil Inventories is Poor ............................................................... 6 
1.2.2 Problems with Futures Data as an Indicator of Speculative Activity .............. 8 
1.2.3 Open Interest Positions .................................................................................... 9 
2. Methodology and VAR Model Specifications............................................................ 11 
2.1. Data/Variables...................................................................................................... 11 
2.2. VAR Model for the Market of Crude Oil ............................................................ 12 
3. Identification ............................................................................................................... 15 
3.1. Identification Based on Sign Restrictions ............................................................ 15 
3.2. Bound on Price Elasticity of Oil Supply .............................................................. 16 
3.3 Bound on Price Elasticity of Oil Demand............................................................. 17 
4. Results ......................................................................................................................... 19 
4.1. Oil Supply/Demand Shocks Results .................................................................... 19 
4.1.1 Crude Oil Inventories and Oil Future Spreads (1983.4-2008.12).................. 19 
4.1.2. Was Speculation the Culprit of the 2003-2008 Oil Price Shock?................. 22 
4.2. Short – Run Elasticity of Oil Demand ................................................................. 25 
4.2.1 Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Production .............................. 25 
 x 
 
4.2.2 Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Use ......................................... 27 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 28 
References ....................................................................................................................... 30 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 32 
MATLAB Code Adapted to Oil Future Spreads - (1983.4 - 2008.12) ....................... 32 
Bays Draws ............................................................................................................. 32 
Main ........................................................................................................................ 33 
Figure 1 ................................................................................................................... 34 
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................... 37 
MATLAB Code for Oil Inventories Adapted to Time Frame - (1983.4 -2008.12) .... 38 
Bays Draws ............................................................................................................. 38 
Main ........................................................................................................................ 39 
Figure 1 ................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................... 43 
Annex .............................................................................................................................. 45 
Descripetive Statistics ................................................................................................. 45 
Oil Production ......................................................................................................... 45 
Real Activity ........................................................................................................... 46 
Real Price of Oil...................................................................................................... 47 
Spread...................................................................................................................... 48 
Inventory ................................................................................................................. 49 
 xi 
 
Figures Index 
Figure 1- Commercial inventories of crude oil plotted against the spot price of oil ........ 6 
Figure 2- Open interest in future contracts ....................................................................... 9 
Figure 3- Net long positions of non-commercial traders ................................................ 10 
Figure 4- Structural impulse responses (1983.4-2008.12) - Inventories ........................ 20 
Figure 5- Structural impulse responses (1983.4-2008.12) - Oil Spreads........................ 21 
Figure 6- Historical decomposition for (1983.4-2008.12) .............................................. 23 
 
Tables Index 
Table 1- Sign restrictions on impact responses in the vector autoregressive model ...... 15 
Table 2- Posterior distribution of the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil – 
Oil Inventories................................................................................................................. 25 
Table 3- Posterior distribution of the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil26 
 
 
  
 xii 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
CFTC – Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
CME – Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
GAI – Global Activity Index 
G7 – The Group of Seven  
IEA – International Energy Agency 
IRF – Impulse Response Functions 
NYMEX – New York Mercantile Exchange  
OECD -  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
SVAR – Structural Vector Autoregressive 
USA – United States of America 
VAR – Vector Autoregressive 
WTI – West Texas Intermediate 
 
Does Speculation Affect Oil Price Volatility? 
 
1 
Introduction 
The factor that motivated the carrying out of the present dissertation is imbedded in the 
need to quench the thirst of curiosity for the sporadic run-up of crude oil prices in the 
most recent crude oil price bubble in the 2003- mid 2008 period. This phenomenon of the 
price of oil has been debated by commentators, analysts and academic researchers. Some 
issues are still open and can be summarized in the following: Might the surge be due to 
speculative trading? Is it the reduction in oil supply caused by the OPEC (Organiza t ion 
for Economic Co-operation and Development)? These issues lead us to blame traders and 
investors on the one hand and to deduce that economic growth may have been the result 
of the rise in the real price of oil on the other, especially in emerging Asian markets. 
Recent papers recognize that stock demand and flow demand for oil are an important 
aspect in modeling for the real price of oil. Some of the research papers that we have 
considered in our work are Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), Alquist and Kilian (2010) 
and Kilian and Murphy (2014), among others. For example, Kilian and Murphy (2014) 
added on to the Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model of Kilian (2009) by 
identifying the speculative component using speculative demand shocks as an extra 
restriction and using inventories as an additional variable. 
This paper will use a structural Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model of the global market 
for crude oil that has the objective of explaining the underlying determinants of the real 
price of oil, quantifying the effects of demand and supply shocks. The original model 
proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014) sought out to draw conclusions of the economic 
theory for storable commodities, drawing assumptions about the expected direction of the 
real price of oil and its fundamental determinants, driven by the force of supply and 
demand.  
Studies on the commodity future prices are very frequent, they are usually criticized and 
seen as bad indicators of forecast power, future prices seem to do no better than random 
walk forecasts, Alquist and Kilian (2010). Therefore, one of the objectives of this work 
is to debunk this criticism by using Lutz Kilian’s and Dan Murphy’s model and to closely 
study their work by substituting crude oil inventories for futures spreads between the spot 
price and future price of oil. 
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It is important to put out that the purpose of the present work is not to take a stand on the 
social morality of speculative activity nor does it define unhealthy speculative behavior. 
There is no attempt in distinguishing normal speculation from excessive speculation. 
Alquist and Kilian (2010) conclude that for short maturities the deviation of the future-
spot relationship is small, meaning that even though futures might do no better than 
random walk models they are not completely excluded as a predictor of the real price of 
oil. Having that in mind, the spread theory used as a variable in our model is the same as 
Alquist and Kilian (2010).  
Traditional VAR models construct their market expectations on past data of the variables. 
Having a forward-looking structure keeps flow demand and flow supply valid, because it 
assumes that not all traders base their prediction of future demand and supply on historica l 
data, we consider that not all traders are chartists and that the fundamentals of future 
movements shouldn’t only be based off of historical data. Open interest positions shift 
rapidly in response to news of oil discoveries, war or just trader’s uncertainty about future 
oil supply and future global market consumption of said commodity.  
Expectations of a shortfall of future oil supply, relative to demand not captured by the 
basic flow demand and flow supply shocks, altering the price of oil, is referred to as a 
speculative demand shock. It is these shocks that have policymakers and researchers 
attributing oil price volatility to speculative activity. These shocks cannot be directly 
observed and can only be identified within the model.  
Who is a speculator? A speculator is a non-commercial agent with imperfect information 
regarding the evolution of oil price fundamentals that only enters the market on arbitrage 
to make money, Vansteenkiste (2011). Speculative purchasers reflect increased 
uncertainty about future supply and demand conditions, Alquist and Kilian (2010).  
Section 2 explains Methodology and VAR Model Specifications based on Kilian and 
Murphy (2014) and present the variables used in the model and their sources. Section 3 
gives an insight on the identification process based on sign restriction and the additiona l 
imposed boundaries. In section 4 we discuss the results and impacts of speculative activity 
in general and how it may or may not be responsible for oil price swings, especially the 
heavily debated 2003- mid 2008 period. 
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1. Literature Review  
1.1. Insight on the NYMEX and Crude Oil Futures Market 
The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) trading floors started off as a tight-knit 
circle of family farm businesses as an egg, cheese and butter market in 1872, this was 
before organized oil trading was in existence. New York dairy merchants would all gather 
to exchange goods, recording prices by hand with chalk on old large blackboards, working 
for only a few hours a day. Today there is only one remanence of that time, sticking to a 
farmer’s market hours, some four and a half hours working days. As years passed, the 
market kept growing in a skyrocket fashion, trades went from million to billions. 
Merchants and Farmers that were able to keep up with the market started to bring in their 
sons and each new generation found itself willing to run more risk to protect their growing 
legacy and global fiefdom. Debt after debt and default after default, run in with the law 
and family feuds were not able to shake down this “dog eat dog market”. After more than 
130 years of failure after failure nobody would guess that it would become the biggest oil 
market on earth.  
In fact, the oil market did not begin with the masterminds and wilder beasts of the trading 
floors but with a sour relationship between father and son. Michel Marks was the engineer 
of the modern oil market, the son of the well-known Francis Marks that at one time owned 
the most seats on the NYMEX floor due to his flourishing fruits and vegetables business, 
Paris Foods. When Michel first entered the pits the cash crop was the Maine potato, a 
major commodity at the time known for keeping the balance of world power. The Maine 
potato represented 80% of the NYMEX market but the prices were greatly manipulated 
by the older traders, breaking the market in an irreparable fashion. Not only traders but 
also corrupt farmers, corrupt market officials, and potatoes passing inspection in Maine 
but showing up spoiled at delivery date. Trains that were supposedly filled with potatoes 
would arrive empty, these inside jobs tinkering with supplies were meant to influence the 
prices and drive them from their fundamental values.  
In 1976, potatoes were the third most traded commodity in the United Stated and in that 
same year prices soared from $5 a contract to $19 a contract. This era of fast and loose 
market regulations ended for the potato market when it caught the governments attention 
and it intervened in the potato crisis. The newly created Commodity Futures Trading 
Does Speculation Affect Oil Price Volatility? 
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Commission (CFTC), the new market watchdog, banned the trading of potato futures for 
an indefinite time.  
This move killed the most prosperous and thriving business on the NYMEX floor and it 
had lost the only legitimacy it had. NYMEX floor seats that were priced at $47.000 had 
now plunged to $5.000, leaving seat holders furious and seeking a new alternative to 
trade. Younger seat holders and traders wanted a new leader with a decent education and 
one that wasn’t a potato trading freak like the older seat holders and traders. It was then 
in 1977 that Michel Marks saw himself become the youngest NYMEX chairman.   
In 1983 Ronald Regan removed the final energy barrier, giving birth to the futures 
contracts on light, sweet crude oil. After submitting the proposal to the CFTC, and 
fighting with the commissions board to approve the NYMEX contracts before the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), on the 30th of March of 1983 the first contracts on 
crude oil were traded. NYMEX debuted futures contracts on West Texas Intermed iate 
(WTI) with delivery point Cushing, Oklahoma, and on the same day CME started trading 
futures contracts on Louisiana light, sweet crude oil, with delivery point in Parish, 
Louisiana. These contracts would be shaped and maintained with the help of Louis 
Guttmann, that would later come to assume the paper of chairman on the NYMEX board.  
 
 
“No one had taught the traders how to build the world’s first free oil market. And no 
one had left them with any idea of how to keep it from spinning out of control” 
      Leah McGrath Goodman, The Asylum, pg. 95  
Does Speculation Affect Oil Price Volatility? 
 
5 
1.2. Using Oil Futures as an Indicator of Market Expectations 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) claim that using oil inventories is the best measure to capture 
the market expectations, because most of the relevant information is already included in 
the inventory data.  
Kilian and Murphy (2014) also don’t use futures because they already use inventor ies 
making the use of futures redundant as well as disadvantageous due to the fact that crude 
oil futures only came into play in the 1980’s, leaving most of their sample nonexistent.   
Oil futures prices reflect the agreement between buyers and sellers at a given delivery 
month. These prices should be an indicator of the investors’ expectations of the market’s 
behavior for any given commodity. 
Many authors state that a random walk model is as good if not better predictor of the 
future behavior of crude oil prices, and is used as a benchmark to prove or disprove the 
efficiency of the forecasting performance of other models. As studied by Reeve and 
Vigfusson (2011), futures constantly outperform the random walk model.  
Wu and McCallum (2005) used a “future-spot spread” model and concluded that the 
standard deviation prediction errors range anywhere from 10% (1-month maturity) of the 
spot price to 30% (12-month horizon). They concur that predicting oil price movements 
in near term (short contract dates), up to 4 months, is a better indicator than a random 
walk. An observation worth noting is that future prices are more useful in forecasting 
near-term oil price movement and future contracts with small maturities are much more 
liquid in the futures market. As referred by Alquist and Kilian (2010), the sizes of open 
positions for short maturity contracts, 1-3 months, is of large volume and are much more 
accurate when compared to long maturity contracts, because those become more 
vulnerable to shocks that are not related to oil price movements in the future.  
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1.2.1 Why Data on Oil Inventories is Poor 
Following the assumption of Khan (2009), oil inventories are notoriously poor because 
many important non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries (OECD) do not report any data at all. Most of these non-OECD countries, that 
make up half of the demand for crude oil, including many large consumers such as China, 
do not report any data on oil inventories. Oil stored in tankers, “oil at sea”, is also not 
reported in the data for crude oil inventories, distorting the data used for many studies 
using such variable. Singleton (2010) states that most arguments supporting a historica l 
linkage between supply/demand and inventory accumulations are wrong. A view held by 
many authors of the subject states that speculative trading tends to distort the prices of 
crude oil and is accompanied by an increase in inventory levels. These facts are partially 
true for historical data before the 2002-mid 2008 period, except in the occurrence of other 
oil “Boom/Bust” phenomenon, where the relationship of supply/demand-inventory levels 
makes little sense and many times has a negative relationship.  
Figure 1- Commercial inventories of crude oil plotted against the spot price of oil 
Note: Contango1 and Backwardation2 are defined using spot price and the three-month futures prices. 
                                                 
1 Cotango - refers to a situation where the future spot price is below the current price, and people are willing  
to pay more for a commodity at some point in the future than the actual expected price of the commodity. 
 
2  Backwardation - As the contract approaches expiration, the futures contract trades at a higher price 
compared to when the contract was further away from expiration 
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Singleton (2010) used data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) to 
construct Figure 1 (above). It illustrates the inventory (millions of barrels) - price 
relationship that has been heavily debated by fundamentalists and speculators. The EIA 
(2008) claims that if speculation drives up prices then an imbalance in the form of higher 
stocks should be apparent. Some speculators claim that they did not find evidence of 
inventory hording on behalf of refiners (e.g, Hamilton (2009)), others argue that there 
was a visible rise in the 2004 to 2006 period and it serves as an evidence for speculation 
(e.g, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2006)).  
From figure 1, prior to 2003, we can deduce that the oil price-inventory relationship was 
strongly negative. Said relationship then turned significantly positive from 2004 to 2007, 
as can be seen by the large rise in the adjusted R squared value, revealing some level of 
significance between the oil price-inventory relationship. Looking at the 2007 period, 
there is a weakening in the relationship, being largely negative with only a slight positive 
gain in the first half of 2008. The problem with studying this relationship is the omitted 
stockpiling of strategic reserves from major emerging economies, a problem noted in the 
above text by Khan (2009). This is only a small portion of the oil price-inventory 
relationship due to the fact of lacking data on reserves from major emerging economies. 
Data from G7 is bad enough in terms of reliability, and it’s the best there is, taking away 
data from large consumers like China only makes the price-inventory relationship 
studying even harder.  
Pirrong (2009) points out that there is no stable relationship between the price of oil and 
inventory data, and the relationship that might exist is just a consequence of increased 
supply/demand uncertainty. There is no theoretical reasoning to backup this theory of 
changes in prices having correlation with oil inventories. Another factor to keep in mind 
is that speculation plays a true role in defining oil prices, inventory adjustments depend  
mainly on what one assumes to be the nature of supply/demand, even if it is all just pure 
speculation.  
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1.2.2 Problems with Futures Data as an Indicator of Speculative Activity 
Using oil futures as an indicator of speculative activity has its ups and downs. For one, 
there is no way in isolating the speculative component in net open positions, unless one 
separates commercial from non-commercial positions. This is so because non-
commercial traders are foreseen as the speculators in the market, commercial traders are 
related to hedging positions to protect their demand for oil. Isabel Vansteenkiste (2011) 
estimates that 20% of traders at NYMEX are non-commercial, they are not in the market 
to hedge prices for consumption or selling, basically they just bet on the direction of 
prices. Future prices should equal their spot counterpart plus the price of carry3 and the 
convenience yield4. Most of these non-commercial traders have an imperfect knowledge 
of the determinants of oil prices and the evolution of fundamentals that make up these 
prices. They do not take into account fundamentals and base their expectations of prices 
and trading strategies upon observed historical patterns in past prices, Vansteenkiste 
(2011).  Benefit of entry for these traders increases with expected deviation of oil prices 
from their fundamentals, the further the future prices deviate from underlying 
fundamentals, the more non-commercial fundamental traders are willing to enter the 
market. The factors that drive the oil futures prices at each moment in time will depend 
on the share of non-commercial traders present in the futures market, Vansteenkiste 
(2011).  
Many authors have commented on the use of futures, such as Hamilton (2009), Alquist 
and Kilian (2010), and Kilian and Murphy (2014). They claim that there is an arbitrage 
condition that links real oil prices in the spot market to their future market counterpart. 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) use oil inventories because they argue that speculation drives 
up the price of oil in the futures market, thus arbitrage will imply that traders buy 
inventory in the spot market to hedge/profit in the futures market. This way, they can 
quantify speculation using inventory volatility in the spot market, studying its behavior 
to different economic shocks. In their defense, oil inventories are easier to read and use 
in modeling consumption of said commodity, and futures only came around in the early 
                                                 
3 Price of carry - The sum of the cost of storage plus the interest rate. 
 
4 Convenience yield - the benefit from holding spot oil which accrues to the owner of the spot commodity. 
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eighties, which would make most of their study redundant. Modeling using oil future 
spreads can become invalid in when the arbitrage between spot and futures markets is less 
than perfect, making the data invalid. A hard task of using oil spreads is imposing 
identifying information about price elasticity of oil demand, Kilian and Murphy (2014). 
Nonetheless it has not been proven impossible and we believe it is possible to overcome 
this task.  
1.2.3 Open Interest Positions  
In the light of the above, one question arises: What is a rise in open interest positions5? 
The rising share of non-commercial traders in all open interest positions tend to increase 
during the period of rising oil prices, 2003-mid 2008. This is a result of oil becoming a 
popular asset because of the troubles with the housing market worldwide and the 
beginning of the financial crisis, driving investors to the alternative commodities market. 
During this time frame, the habitual commodities traders were joined by pension funds 
and commodity index fund in the speculative game.  
Figure 2- Open interest in future contracts 
                                                 
5 Open interest positions - the total number of open or outstanding, not closed or delivered positions, in the 
options and futures contracts that exist on a given day and are delivered on a particular day. 
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Non-commercial traders are a key factor in providing the necessary liquidity for the 
buyers and sellers in the market, so the entry of speculative capital in the crude oil future 
market will in general improve the functioning of the market. It may seem that speculators 
are to blame for the increase in oil prices because their activities influence the spot price 
by pushing up future prices, assuming that a higher oil future price feeds back the 
tendency into the spot price. The figure below is a description of open net-long positions, 
betting on rising prices, against open short positions, betting on falling prices.  In the time 
frame being analyzed it is easy to spot the offset of open long positions by the non-
commercial traders all through the price surge of 2003-mid 2008 period. From analyzing 
the data below we can deduce that net-long positions increase after prices increase, 
meaning that speculation may follow movements in the spot price.  
 
Figure 3- Net long positions of non-commercial traders 
In conclusion, for near term contracts, future prices contain important information of 
future oil movements. With these facts in hand, the substitution of oil inventories for short 
term futures, in the indicated time frame, could be considered as a good indicator to 
capture market expectations.  
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2. Methodology and VAR Model Specifications 
2.1. Data/Variables 
The data on the global crude oil production (∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡) was made available by the EIA in 
the Monthly Energy Review, the data is available from the monthly database. It includes 
lease condensates but exclude natural gas liquids. In the model, the data on oil production 
is expressed in log-differences.  
Real price of oil (∆𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑡) is the log of the real price of oil defined as the United 
States (U.S.) refiners acquisition cost for imported crude oil. This data was found as 
reported by the U.S. EIA and deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) and 
demeaned. As referred by Kilian and Murphy (2014), the refiners acquisition cost for 
crude oil is a better proxy because the U.S. price of domestic crude oil was regulated 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, making refiners acquisition cost a better price for crude 
oil markets. CPI is used to deflate the real price of oil and was made available by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, seasonally adjusted and monthly reported. 
Oil demand can be commonly found in two different proxies, first is the Global Activity 
Index (GAI), used by Kilian (2009), the second is the log-difference of the global 
production index (∆𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝐴𝑡), used by Kilian and Murphy (2014) and by Beidas-Strom 
and Pescatori (2014). Since this thesis rests on the work of Kilian and Murphy (2014), 
the latter was used as the variable for oil demand in the model.  
Futures prices were taken from the Journal of Applied Econometrics, where Alquist and 
Kilian (2010) published their work on What We Learn from The Price of Crude Oil 
Futures. Their commercial provider was Price-Data.com. CPI is used to deflate the future 
price of oil and was made available by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, seasonally 
adjusted and monthly reported. They constructed their data for various maturities by 
identifying the h-month futures contracts trading closest to the last trading day of the 
month and used the price associated with that contract as the end-of-month value. Since 
the model in study uses only 1- month futures contracts, the continuous monthly time 
series is based on a backward-looking window of at most three days. This approach has 
the objective of computing in consistent matter end-of-month time series for oil future 
prices, allowing for the closest match possible of future prices and spot prices. The 
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variable created with this data is similar to the futures spread (∆𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡) used in the 
published work of Alquist and Kilian (2010). It is a different approach that uses the spread 
between spot prices and future prices as an indicator of the volatility direction of the price 
of oil. In the occasion of the future price equaling the spot price, the spread will be an 
indicator of the expected change in said spot prices.  
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡 = 1+ 𝐿𝑁(
𝐹𝑡
(ℎ)
𝑆𝑡
)                                                           (1) 
Ft (h) is the price of the future price of oil of maturity (h), be it 1-month or 3-month future 
and so on. St is the real price of oil for a given period in time. Both the future and spot 
prices are multiplied by the CPI to adjust prices to inflation.  
This model is an adaptation of the Kilian Murphy (2014) model, estimated on monthly 
data over the sample period of April 1983-December 2008. The data for all variables 
starts in April of 1983 because it was on the 30th of March 1983 that crude oil futures 
were first traded on the NYMEX floors. All of the variables were taken from the Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, where Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Alquist and Kilian (2010) 
published their work and data. It was then used as a reference and manipulated to fit the 
needs of the model used in this dissertation.  
2.2. VAR Model for the Market of Crude Oil 
Our model is based on Kilian and Murphy (2014) and consists of a four-variable model 
and its reduced form allows for two years’ worth of lags. Hamilton and Herrera (2004) 
argue that a lag length of 24 months (2 years) is sufficient to capture the dynamics in the 
data modeling business cycles of commodity markets. The importance of long lags was 
also cited by Killian (2009), claiming they allow for a long delay in the effects of oil 
prices and for a sufficient number of lags to remove serial correlation. Long lags are 
equally important in structural models of the world oil market to account for low 
frequency co-movement between the real rice of oil and global economic activity. Kanga, 
Rattib and Yoo (2014) find that anticipated reduction in crude oil production is closely 
associated with an increase in implied co-variance of return and volatility that extends for 
up to 24 months.  
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The demand indicator of the model will be the log-difference of the global industr ia l 
production index, capturing the demand for crude oil. To exemplify the supply indicator 
the log-difference in global crude oil production will be used, this will consist of above 
ground production only.  
The standard VAR, corresponding to the structural model of the global oil market, is 
written as follows: 
                                           β0yt =  ∑  𝛽24𝑖=1 iyt-i + εt                                                             (2) 
This model is the same one used by Kilian and Murphy (2014). In this case εt  is the 
representation of a (4x1) vector of uncorrelated structural innovations. The βi, i=0, …24 
(l), is the impact on the coefficient matrices at the i-th lag where the demand and supply 
elasticities are found.  
Vector εt consists of four structural shocks. The first shock is the flow supply shock that 
is associated to a negative response of the price for crude oil and a numbing down of the 
global production index business cycle. These shocks incorporate supply disruptions that 
are associated with political events linked to oil producing countries, and unexpected 
supply decisions by OPEC members and other flow supply shocks.  A negative flow 
supply shock triggers a predictable increase in the real price of oil, meaning that the 
expected future price can be above or below the spot price of oil when the futures contact 
maturity comes to terms, as can be seen below (3). 
                                       (
𝐹𝑡
(ℎ)
𝑆𝑡
) = 1  or  (
𝐹𝑡
(ℎ)
𝑆𝑡
) > 1  or (
𝐹𝑡
(ℎ)
𝑆𝑡
) < 1                                 (3) 
This gap of uncertainty between future and spot price reaction to the negative flow supply 
shock makes it hard to imply sign restrictions, much like the behavior of inventories that 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) cite in their work. Positive flow supply shock, shifts to the 
right of the contemporaneous oil demand curve along the oil supply curve, raise prices 
and stimulate oil production. Like the situation of a negative flow supply shock, it is hard 
to tell how it will impact the futures spread.  
A flow demand shock induces an increase in real activity, shifting the contemporaneous 
oil demand curve to the right along the supply curve. This will raise by consequence the 
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price of oil, which should in effect increase or stimulate the production of crude oil on 
impact to foment the increased demand caused by unexpected fluctuations in the business 
cycle.  
The third shock is the speculative demand shock, it captures the use of our oil spreads 
arising from a forward-looking behavior not otherwise captured by the model. A positive 
speculative demand shock will shift demand for oil, causing traders to raise expected 
future prices and causing the real price of oil to increase on impact. The effect of rising 
prices will in turn stimulate production and reduce oil consumption (real activity). Both 
flow demand shocks and flow supply shocks have the expected behavior, but differ 
because flow demand shocks involve an increase in demand, whereas speculative demand 
shocks do not. Speculative shocks are fed by traders’ perception of what other traders 
think evolves or simply beliefs not related to fundamentals. The present econometric 
model does not specify how expectations should be formed and that gives a new insight 
on the flexibility of the crude oil market.  
Finally, there is a residual oil demand shock that is designed to capture idiosyncratic oil 
demand shocks driven by reasons not explained by any of the anterior structural shocks. 
Non-accounted shocks can be caused by various factors with no direct economic 
interpretation such as changes in inventory, technology, political reasons, and or 
Petroleum Reserve releases that may be politically derived.  
The admissible model takes shape and is represented below (4), the matrix has the applied 
structural sign restriction that will be explained in section 3.1 of the present work. It is 
important to mention that missing signs denote that no restrictions were applied. This 
matrix differs from table 1 because it includes residual demand shocks, the fourth 
innovation. Given the difficulty of economically identifying the conglomerate of 
idiosyncratic residual demand shocks, the results will not be interpreted. Kilian and 
Murphy (2014) claim that they are too weak to be true determinants of the real price of 
oil.  
           
(
 
 
𝑒∆𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑
𝑒∆𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝐴
𝑒∆𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑔  𝑅𝑃𝑂
𝑒∆𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑔  𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑
)
 
 
= (
− + + 𝑥
− + − 𝑥
+ + + 𝑥
𝑥 𝑥 + 𝑥
)
(
 
 
𝜀 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡
𝑓
𝜀 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡
𝑓
𝜀 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡
𝑓
𝜀 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡
𝑓
)
 
 
              (4) 
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3. Identification  
The VAR model is consistently estimated by least-squares and based on various 
combinations of sign restriction.  To these restrictions are added additional plausib le 
bounds on the magnitude of supply and demand elasticities. Restrictions can be implied 
by economic theory or they can be extrinsic, belonging to no proper explanation or 
economic theory. Identifying restrictions are used and will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
3.1. Identification Based on Sign Restrictions  
Table 1 registers the sign restrictions on the impact responses of futures, real activity, oil 
production and the real price of oil. The restrictions in the table below directly follow the 
model for the market of crude oil explained in the anterior section. These restrictions also 
identify residual innovation but since the results of residuals are extrinsic it is hard to 
interpret them economically. Not being an important determinant of the real price of oil, 
the results are not reported. Sign restriction were also not applied to the flow supply shock 
and flow demand shock because they are hard to economically quantify as outlined in 
section 2.2. 
 
 Flow Supply Shock Flow Demand 
Shock 
Speculative 
Demand Shock 
Oil Production –  + + 
Real Activity – + – 
Real Price of Oil + + + 
Oil Future Spread   + 
 
Table 1- Sign restrictions on impact responses in the vector autoregressive model 
Note: The absence of entries in the Oil future spread flow supply shock and flow demand shock mean that no sign 
restrictions were imposed. 
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Kilian (2009) imposes identifying restrictions on the slope of the short-run oil supply. 
Noting that the short-run oil supply curve is vertical, leaves the assumption that global oil 
production does not respond to oil demand shocks as they happen and are usually lagged 
by a month. The reason for such behavior might be due to the elevated costs and 
repercussions of adjusting production, this method is in line with the OPEC production 
decisions. Sign restrictions on the VAR response functions arise naturally in the context 
of structural models of the oil market. Table 1 is the baseline of sign restrictions, the same 
restrictions used in related works such as Kilian (2009), Baumeister and Peersman (2012); 
Kilian and Murphy (2012); Beidas-Strom and Pescatori (2014) and Kilian and Murphy 
(2014). A number of set restrictions imposed in table 1 are based on a unique response 
pattern caused by each structural shock, referred and explained in section 2.2. 
3.2. Bound on Price Elasticity of Oil Supply 
Using the equation model (2), an estimate of the impact price elasticity can be deducted. 
The ratio of the impact responses of oil production and real price of oil to sporadic 
increase in speculative demand or in demand. There is a need for boundary restrictions, 
in addition to the sign restrictions, because it will allow for better candidates when 
selecting admissible models. This sets a boundary on unrealistic oil supply responses, 
from other literary works such as Hamilton (2009), it can be concluded that in the absence 
of significant excess production capacity, the short-run price elasticity of oil supply is low 
if not effectively zero. Kilian (2009) suggests that changing production is costly so even 
in the presence of space capacity; the response of oil supply might not be directly in line 
with the price signals. In the case of our work, using oil futures, we will see if production 
responds to future price changes. Kellogg (2011) suggests that in his study he found no 
response of oil production to oil future price change.  
Kilian and Murphy (2014), impose a bound of 0.025 on the impact price elasticity of oil 
supply, for this study the same will be kept.  
 
            Maxi≠1 
𝑎1𝑖
𝑎3𝑖
⁄  < 0.025 – price elasticity of oil supply              (5) 
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These restrictions narrow down the admissible models, Beidas-Strom and Pescatori 
(2011) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) use 5 million candidates. The model in this thesis 
only uses 500000, this is because tests were run for more candidates and the results were 
the same. Having less computational power it made it possible to run the model more 
times using fewer rotations.  
3.3 Bound on Price Elasticity of Oil Demand  
Using the equation model (2), an estimate of the impact price elasticity of oil demand can 
be deducted. The ratio of the impact responses of oil production and real price of oil to 
unexpected increase in speculative demand or in demand. To Kilian and Murphy (2014), 
the relevant measure is the sum of oil production flow and the consumption of oil held in 
inventory triggered by an oil supply shock. Much like them, this model uses the same 
method except it uses oil spreads instead of oil inventories, using the movement of the 
spread price the same way they use oil inventory depletion. The construction of the price 
elasticity of oil demand in use is as follows: 
                                                 ∆𝑈𝑡= ∆𝑄𝑡  − ∆
2
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡                                                             
(6) 
The oil in use is denoted as ∆𝑈𝑡 ,for a given t period, and is equal to the quantity of oil 
produced ∆𝑄𝑡  minus the spread ∆
2
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡
.  
                                                  𝑛𝑡
𝑈𝑠𝑒 =  
%∆𝑈𝑡
%∆𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑡
                                     (7) 
The price elasticity of oil in use is defined as 𝑛𝑡
𝑈𝑠𝑒 , where %∆ represents a percentage 
change to an oil supply shock at a given period t and %∆𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑡 is the real price of oil. It 
refers to the resulting elasticity measured as oil demand elasticity in production. The 
elasticity can be estimated as a ratio of the impact response of oil production to an oil 
supply shock, relative to the impact response of the real price of oil. Percentage change 
in oil demand %∆𝑈𝑡  is calculated as follows: 
                                                   %∆𝑈𝑡= 
∆𝑄𝑡−∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡
2
𝑄𝑡−1 −∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡−1
                                    (8) 
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Construction of the price elasticity of oil in use depends on the historical data of oil 
production 𝑄𝑡−1 , which means it will be time varying, while demand elasticity in 
production is not. Therefore, the oil demand elasticity reported is an average made over 
the sample period.  
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4. Results 
Identification restrictions described in the anterior section are not know-all for structural 
impulse responses. The jmax value in Kilian and Murphy (2014) generate 5 million 
rotations based on the reduced-form VAR estimate, and to replicate their study using oil 
future spreads we imposed a reduced number of rotations of only 500000. Of these 
candidate models that were yielded, the selection was down to the candidate models that 
satisfied all of the identification restriction.   
4.1. Oil Supply/Demand Shocks Results 
The figures in section 4.1.1 plot the results of each variable in the model to the 
supply/demand shocks with the 68% posterior error bands obtained by drawing from the 
reduced-form posterior distribution. Figure 4 and figure 5 illustrate the roles of inventory 
storage and oil future spreads, and the way they differ depending on the nature of the 
shocks in question. Shocks have been normalized as they imply an increase in the real 
price of oil. The objective of the following section is to compare the results using 
inventories, Kilian and Murphy (2014), with our assumption of crude oil future spreads. 
The Kilian and Murphy (2014) time series was reduced to match the beginning of market 
traded crude oil futures that only came into existence in 1983.  
4.1.1 Crude Oil Inventories and Oil Future Spreads (1983.4-2008.12) 
Figure 4 is a plot of structural impulse responses to three distinct supply/demand shocks 
and how they have an impact on oil inventories in the mentioned time frame. Much like 
the assumptions of Beidas-Strom and Pescatori (2014) and Kilian and Murphy (2014), 
the changing of the time series does not seem to affect the plot of the responses to certain 
structural shocks. Flow supply shocks seem to draw down inventory levels to smooth the 
production of crude oil, shocks much similar to the sign restriction table mentioned in 
anterior sections.  
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Figure 4- Structural impulse responses (1983.4-2008.12) - Inventories 
Global real activity is reduced when faced with negative flow supply shocks, and the same 
happens with the production of oil at an initial stage, but within a couple of months the 
behavior is reduced and normalized. In this situation, the real price of oil rises at an init ia l 
stage and falls back to normal levels, as global activity keeps falling so does the price of 
oil. At the one-year mark it falls below its starting value.  
Positive flow demand shocks keep oil inventories close to the zero-base line, with little 
to no drop in the following months. After a year or so the inventories rise above their 
initial level, but all in all this type of shock seems to have little to no effect on the 
inventory levels. In contrast to what happens with flow supply shocks, the global activity 
rises initially a par with the real price of oil, both peaking close to year end and dropping 
from there onward. Oil production sees a slight rise with a similar peak at year end which 
is followed in a descending matter from there onward.  
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Shocks of speculative nature cause a constant rise in the levels of oil inventories and an 
immediate rise in the real price of oil that gradually settles at the 10-month mark. The oil 
production and real activity are barely affected by the speculative shock, although 
negative all through the sample, it is small. Even though the sample period in study differs 
from that of Kilian and Murphy (2014), the structural impulse responses of all three 
shocks seem largely unmodified, leaving us with the assumption that there is economic 
reasoning behind this theory.  
Figure 5- Structural impulse responses (1983.4-2008.12) - Oil Spreads 
Figure 5 is a plot of structural impulse responses of three distinct supply/demand shocks 
and how they have an impact on oil future spreads in the mentioned time frame, along 
with other factor variables in the model. Flow supply shocks cause spreads to fall, having 
only a small peak within the first three months, but then resumes to fall. This can be 
explained with the rise of the real price of oil in the first few months, to the end it seems 
that spread values seem to rise as the real price of oil drops below its starting value, but 
the volatile nature of the spread output makes it hard to fully analyze. Real activity drops 
along with oil production, this explains the rise in the real price of oil. The behavior that 
affect these variables is similar to that of the flow supply shock with inventories, Kilian 
and Murphy (2014).  
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Flow demand shocks cause an uncertain effect on oil spreads, they start with a large 
decline in value and at the five-month mark reach a peak similar to the starting value, 
followed again by a small drop and a rise towards the end. This behavior seems to be a 
bit in line with that of the real price of oil and real activity, they all seem to have a peak 
around the 10-month period and begin to drop from there onward until the end of the 
sample, much in line with the results obtained by Kilian and Murphy (2014). The init ia l 
drop in the spread value might have to do with a more rapid rise in the real price of oil 
than initially predicted by the futures values which causes a drop in the spread value 
calculation as can be analyzed in figure 5.  Oil production rises slightly and slowly until 
the end of the sample period.  
Speculative shocks have a very volatile effect on oil spreads, both oil spreads and oil 
prices are subject to an initial immediate rise, over time the real price of oil tends to 
decline, much like the behavior observed by Kilian and Murphy (2014). Oil spreads seem 
to not have a rational behavior, being in a constant rise and fall through the whole sample.  
One thing that can be analyzed is that at the ten-month mark oil spreads do begin to rise 
at a significant speed and the real price of oil falls. This can mean one of two thigs, either  
future prices maintain a steady value as the real price of oil drops or futures prices rise, 
creating a larger gap between the real price of oil and future prices. All other variables, 
oil production and real activity, suffer little to no alterations. 
4.1.2. Was Speculation the Culprit of the 2003-2008 Oil Price Shock? 
Large and sporadic increases in oil prices between 2003 and mid 2008 are attributed to 
speculation caused by a large influx of financial investors in the oil futures market. This 
phenomenon can be observed in section 1.2.3, where open interest positions are explained 
and how a rise in non-commercial traders might be correlated with a rise in oil prices. A 
large influx in the futures market drove up oil futures prices, that rise was viewed by the 
spot market participants as an indicator of an increase in expected oil prices.  
Speculative shocks in the VAR model should be able to explain this sporadic surge in the 
real price of oil after 2003. Looking at the cumulative effects of speculative demand shock 
on the real price of oil in figure 6, it shows that for the use of inventories (right) there is 
no upward movement in the price of oil after 2003 associated with speculative demand 
shocks.  
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Figure 6- Historical decomposition for (1983.4-2008.12) 
Note: The vertical bars signal other events in the crude oil markets much like the one in 2003-2008. It is an illustration 
of the cumulative effect of flow supply/demand/speculative shocks on the price of oil. On the left side figure 6 displays  
the use of spreads and on the right, it displays the use of oil spreads.   
To the left is the output obtained using oil spreads, and much like with inventories, there 
is no upward movement in the price of oil after 2003 that can rule in favor of a speculative 
demand shock. From these results it can be concluded that the large influx of non-
commercial investors and traders entering the oil market has not driven up future prices. 
Fattouh (2013) suggest that there is an operational distinction between what is excessive 
or normal (fundamental) when it comes to speculative activity. From the image on the 
right, Kilian and Murphy (2014) find no evidence of any type of speculation and suggest 
that the lack of speculation in the physical market represents a lack of speculation in its 
financial counterpart. There cannot be speculation under any definition if it does not apply 
to both. From using spreads (left) it is easy to concur with their hypothesis because there 
is a lack of speculation regarding future-spot spreads, as there is lack of speculation in the 
physical market.  
If not speculation, was OPEC to blame? They held back production after 2001 in 
anticipation of even higher oil prices and used oil below the ground as inventories.  
A way to observe this is analyzing the cumulative effects of flow supply shock on the real 
price of oil. The economic effect of OPEC withholding production is a negative flow 
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supply shock. Figure 6 provides no evidence of a negative supply shock, be it with the 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) (right) or the one proposed in this work (left). This rules out 
speculative supply shocks as a valid hypothesis.  
The last theory is based on the global production boom that peaked at around 2006. For 
this theory to be valid there would need to have been a negative supply shock before 2005, 
but as explained in the last hypothesis, the cumulative effect of flow supply shock on the 
real price of oil is pretty limited in explaining any theory. The peak oil theory is also ruled 
out as a hypothesis.  
Surge in the real price of oil was mainly due to change in the flow demand for crude oil, 
associated with a boom in the business cycle. Even professional forecasters were shy on 
predicting this highly underestimated global growth during the 2003-mid 2008 period, 
especially the Asian markets such as China. This thriving rise in the price of oil can be 
observed in the cumulative effect of the flow demand shock on the real price of oil. There 
is a sharp rise in the demand shock during the 2003-mid 2008 period followed by a 
significant drop, start of the financial crisis, and this can be observed in work of Kilian 
and Murphy (2014) (right) and the present model in this work (left). In the annex, there 
is a descriptive analysis of all variables in the model and data with the evolution of said 
variables over the course of the study. If you carefully analyze the real price of oil and 
the real activity (pg.48-50), the dip in the real price of oil in mid-2008 coincides in 
direction with the global real activity.  
With this analysis the consensus is that there are economic fundamentals on the demand 
side of the oil market that can explain the sharp rise of the real price of oil in the last 
couple of years. In this particular case it is easy to rule out speculation as a factor, and 
this finding is particularly exciting because no amount of regulation in the oil markets 
would have made a difference. Kilian and Murphy (2014) claim that an increase of U.S. 
oil production alone would have had no effect on the real price of oil at a global scale, 
while a full recovery of the global economy would raise the price of oil by as much as 
$50.  
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4.2. Short – Run Elasticity of Oil Demand  
Short-Run price elasticity of oil demand has important implications for theoretical models 
of speculative demand. Hamilton (2009) suggests that even without an increase of oil 
inventories it is possible for speculation in the oil futures market to drive up the real price 
of oil via speculation. This can happen when refiners pass on to their consumers 
exogenous increases in the price of oil driven by speculation. For this to result the demand 
for gasoline would need to be price-inelastic.  
This work, and the work of many others, does not give much evidence on the price 
elasticity of oil supply, but from what can be seen it is near zero in the short run. The 
conclusion sought out by Hamilton (2009) are hard to disprove or rule out because of 
elasticity being close to zero.  
4.2.1 Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Production 
The structural model is used to obtain direct estimates of the short-run price elasticity of 
oil demand in production and in use. Elasticity in production can be estimated from model 
(2) and is a ratio of the response of oil production to flow supply shocks, relative to an 
impact response on the real price of oil. In other literature it is evident that short-run price 
of elasticity in oil demand in production is very low.  
Oil Inventories, (1983.4-2008.12) 
  𝒏𝒐,𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  𝒏𝒐,𝑼𝒔𝒆 
𝒏𝒕
𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒚
 ≤ 0.025 16
th percentile 
50th percentile 
84th percentile 
-0.5717 
-0.3444 
-0.1971 
-0.4762 
-0.2313 
-0.0750 
Table 2- Posterior distribution of the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil – Oil Inventories 
Note: The data in table two was the output product of Impulse response functions (IRF)6 process that can be found in 
the annex of this work in MATLAB Code for Oil Inventories Adapted to Time Frame - (1983.4 -2008.12); Main.  
                                                 
6 IRF - dynamic response of the system to a single impulse, or innovation shock, of unit size. This impulse 
response is sometimes called the forecast error impulse response, because the innovations, εt, can be 
interpreted as the one-step-ahead forecast errors. 
Does Speculation Affect Oil Price Volatility? 
 
26 
Spreads, (1983.4-2008.12) 
  𝒏𝒐,𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  𝒏𝒐,𝑼𝒔𝒆 
𝒏𝒕
𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒚
 ≤ 0.025 16
th percentile 
50th percentile 
84th percentile 
-0.6610 
-0.4341 
-0.2294 
-0.6159 
-0.3914 
-0.1802 
Table 3- Posterior distribution of the short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil 
 
Hamilton (2009) calculates an elasticity of -0.06, it is very low and close to zero. In table 
2 Kilian and Murphy (2014), using oil inventories for the period stipulated to fit the needs 
of the present model, calculated a median (50th percentile) elasticity of -0.3444, a much 
larger estimate than other literature. Using oil spreads, the median (50th percentile) 
elasticity estimate is of -0.4342, very close to that of oil inventories. The difference 
between the results obtained in this model from other works is the estimation of a 
structural model and reduced form model. The standard econometric estimates of the 
crude oil demand elasticity fail to take into account the endogeneity of oil prices. When 
predicting the quantity demanded in equilibrium prices are endogenous because 
producers change their prices in response to demand, and consumers change their demand 
in response to the prices. This lack of attention to detail by other investigators lead to 
biased estimates of elasticity that float towards zero.  
Using full structural econometric models allow the results to be unbiased. Baumeister and 
Peersman (2009) use a quarterly time-varying structural VAR model and obtain an 
estimate of oil demand elasticity rounding -0.38. The elasticity estimate is close to ours, 
but differs in variable choice, sample period and the data frequency. Like Kilian and 
Murphy (2014) suggest, the choice of rotations and seed used in the MATLAB VAR 
model will affect the output results. They use 5 million rotations and this study used only 
500000, apart from the sample period and rotations, the seed is the same and for that the 
results are very close to the ones estimated in the original work.  
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The substantial probability mass to values are between -0.1971 and -0.5717 for oil 
inventories (1983.4-2008.12), and between -0.2294 and -0.6610 for spreads (1983.4-
2008.12). Standard deviation for the 68% error band for impulse responses is of 0.1887 
and 0.2159, respectively.  
4.2.2 Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Use 
In section 3.2.2 of the present work, Bound on Price Elasticity of Oil Demand, the 
estimation theory for the price elasticity of oil demand in use is explained. The short-run 
price elasticity of oil demand in use for oil inventories has a median (50th percentile) 
estimate of -0.2313, while the estimate for production is of -0.3444. Short-run price 
elasticity of oil demand in use for spreads has a median (50th percentile) estimate of       -
0.3914 while the same estimate for production has an output value of -0.4341. The results 
are very similar for both variables with the original identification based on sign restriction 
in section 3.1. For flow demand the impact is negative7 as predicted for both inventor ies 
and spreads. These elasticity estimates are far larger than the conventional estimates, and 
in line with economic fundamentals. Kilian and Murphy (2014) conclude, using oil 
inventories, that the surge of oil prices after 2003 is a product of economic fundamenta ls 
that can be observed with larger than usual elasticity estimates. High short-run price 
elasticity of oil demand nullifies the theory of speculation being the culprit for the run-up 
of oil prices in the 2003-mid 2008 period. From the results obtained, using oil spreads, 
the conclusions drawn are in line with those of Kilian and Murphy (2014). They also 
tested for upper bounds of 0.05 and 0.1 and found elasticity output to be very similar, so 
no time was waisted in running our model for such upper bounds. 
  
                                                 
7  Over the short term, demand is more likely to be inelastic because of the limited options to compensate 
to changes in price. Oil is inelastic over the short term, so when the OPEC countries decide to decrease 
supply, from Q1 to Q2, the price increased dramatically, rising from P1to P2. 
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Conclusion 
In this work we adapted the structural model to include shocks to demand through oil 
future spreads, reflecting expectation of future oil supply and demand that cannot be 
captured through the traditional flow supply and flow demand shocks. Traditional VAR 
models tend to focus on shocks to the flow supply and demand for oil, leaving out the 
speculative shocks. Kilian and Murphy (2014) execute this method using crude oil 
inventories as speculative demand shocks that are represented as shifts to the oil demand 
curve, rather than its supply counterpart. Our contribution lies on the substitution of oil 
inventories for oil spreads, from existing literature such as Singleton (2011) it is clear that 
inventories have their limitations. With that mindset we decided to see the effect of oil 
spreads in the same structural model. The structural model present in this dissertation 
includes oil spreads that allow for the identification of three distinct types of shocks 
(supply/demand/speculative) based on historical data that dates back to March 1983 up 
until December of 2008. The adaptation of a different time period is due to the fact that 
oil futures on came into existence in March of 1983. 
Taking into consideration recent policy debates on the run-up of oil prices in the 2003-
mid 2008 period, we thought it would be an interesting theme to dissect. Many popular 
views were debated on this matter, and through this work we try to find the explanation 
that fits best. Our results show evidence disproving the most popular view of a real price 
driven increase via speculation. There is also no evidence for the peak oil theory or that 
it had much effect in the run-up of the real price of oil. Much like the results of Kilian 
and Murphy (2014), ours reflect the same view. The driver of the real price of oil is 
primarily associated with business cycle fluctuations affecting the flow demand for oil. 
An unexpected boom in the business cycle of the world market, especially Asian markets , 
is the underlying fundamental factor that drove up the real price of oil. Comparing the 
evolution of isolated variables, real activity (flow demand) and the real price of oil, we 
can deduce that they rise in similar fashion and both see a sharp fall in the mid 2008 
period onward.  
Another observation to point out is that including the endogeneity of the real price of oil 
allows the present model to estimate traditional oil demand elasticity in production and 
oil supply elasticity in spread movements. This makes our short-run elasticity higher than 
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estimates in other literatures cited throughout this work, casting doubt on models with 
perfect price-inelastic output for crude oil. 
Taking note on recent information, the price of oil is making a comeback with the 
recuperation of the global economy after the financial crisis. As the economy recovers 
and prices rise again, the policy dilemma will come back into play. In underlying 
economic factors are to blame, then extra regulations on the oil markets will have no 
effect in keeping the price of oil under control, nor will sporadic increases in production 
ease the rising prices. The solution to this dilemma might be found in the use of alternative 
energy sources to foment the rising economy or restriction on consumption.  
This work isn’t short on limitation, oil spreads were only calculated for a 1-month 
maturity period and it would have been beneficial to run the model for various maturit ies 
to see the effects of expected future prices in the long run. Lack of computational power 
limited our model runs because it took too long to run each model and would have been 
almost impossible to run the model for various maturities.  
The present study may assist academics and policy makers alike. Academics can pick up 
on the limitations and make the alterations necessary to run the model more times and for 
different maturity horizons. It is a great launching point for studying the behavior of other 
commodities and possibly other financial products bought and sold in the financ ia l 
markets. Policy makers can use the conclusions drawn to draft up new alternatives to 
control the rising prices of oil since sanctioning the global market for crude oil will not 
help with the volatile prices. With speculation out of way, from what we and other 
academics were able to conclude, new alternatives could be drafted, but we will leave that 
to other experts.  
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Appendix 
MATLAB Code Adapted to Oil Future Spreads - (1983.4 - 2008.12) 
The following code is an adaption of Kilian and Murphy (2014). It was made available 
by the Journal of Applied Econometrics where the authors published their work.  
Bays Draws 
%Bayes draws for reduced form parameters of the VAR. 
  
close all; 
clc; 
clear; 
  
global xmax 
  
load kmData 
  
load worldprod 
ProdMBPM=worldprod(2:end)*30/1000; 
OECDCrudeDif=kmData(:,4); 
  
xmax=17;    %horizon 
jmax=1000000;  %number of draws for sign restrictions 
rdraws=50;   %posterior draws 
  
randn('state',1112)% seed 
  
tic; 
[IRFposs 
]=BAYESsign(kmData,xmax,4,24,rdraws,jmax,ProdMBPM,OECDCrudeDif); 
%save IRFpossBayes IRFposs  
%load IRFpossBayes 
toc; 
  
%saving for constructing error bands 
IRMposs=IRFposs; 
save BayesPosterior IRMposs 
%for use in Main.m (Figure 1) 
  
[j k l] = size(IRFposs); 
  
elasuse=zeros(1,l); 
elasprod=zeros(l,1); 
for i=1:l; 
    IRprod=IRFposs(1,1,i); IRinv=IRFposs(4,1,i); 
IRprice=IRFposs(3,1,i); 
    FlowNew=ProdMBPM*(1+IRprod/100)-mean(OECDCrudeDif)-IRinv; 
    Flow=ProdMBPM-mean(OECDCrudeDif); 
    PctChange=100*(FlowNew-Flow)./Flow; 
    ElasUseSeries=PctChange/IRprice; 
    elasuse(i)=mean(ElasUseSeries); 
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    elasprod(i)=IRFposs(1,1,i)./IRFposs(3,1,i); 
end; 
  
%obtain the median elasticity in use 
 medelasuse=median(elasuse) 
    save medelasuse medelasuse; %called by Main.m 
  
elasusepctile=prctile(elasuse,[16 50 84]) 
elasprodpctile=prctile(elasprod,[16 50 84]) 
  
std(elasusepctile) 
std(elasprodpctile) 
 
Main 
lose all; 
clc; 
clear; 
  
global xmax 
  
load kmData 
% percent change in global oil production, real activity index from 
Kilian(AER 2009), the log real price of oil, and changes in OECD crude 
oil spreads 
  
[BETAnc,B,X, SIGMA, U, V]=lsvarcSA(kmData,24); 
  
xmax=17; 
jmax=500000; 
randn('state',316) 
[IRFaer, K]=VARirf(BETAnc,SIGMA,xmax); 
  
  
[IRFposs]=IRFsign(BETAnc,SIGMA,xmax,jmax); 
  
  
[j k l] = size(IRFposs); 
  
load worldprod 
ProdMBPM=worldprod(2:end)*30/1000; 
OECDCrudeDif=kmData(:,4); 
  
  
%imposing additional restrictions 
  
index=1; 
IRFelas=zeros(4^2,xmax+1);  %will be populated with the admissible 
IRFs 
elasticity=IRFposs(9,1,:)./IRFposs(11,1,:);  %supply elasticity in 
response to speculative demand shock 
ADelas=IRFposs(5,1,:)./IRFposs(7,1,:);  %supply elasticity in response 
to flow demand shock 
elasuse=0; 
format short 
for i=1:l; 
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    %%elas in use 
    IRprod=IRFposs(1,1,i); IRinv=IRFposs(4,1,i); 
IRprice=IRFposs(3,1,i); 
    FlowNew=ProdMBPM*(1+IRprod/100)-mean(OECDCrudeDif)-IRinv; 
    Flow=ProdMBPM-mean(OECDCrudeDif); 
    PctChange=100*(FlowNew-Flow)./Flow; 
    ElasUseSeries=PctChange/IRprice; 
    if elasticity(i)<=.0258 && ADelas(i)<=.0258  && 
mean(ElasUseSeries)<=0    && min(cumsum(IRFposs(1,1:12,i)))>=0 && 
min(IRFposs(2,1:12,i))>=0 && max(IRFposs(3,1:12,i))<=0 ; 
        IRFelas(:,:,index)=IRFposs(:,:,i); %admissible IRFs 
        elasuse(index)=mean(ElasUseSeries);  %elasticity in use 
        index=index+1; 
    end; 
   
end; 
  
load medelasuse 
%median of posterior is -.26 
distance=abs(elasuse-medelasuse); 
%find index of IRF with elasuse closest to -.26 
[mindist, findex]=min(distance)   
  
%Figure 1 
Figure1 
  
%Figure 2 
Figure2 
  
%Figures 3 through 7 
Figures3to7; 
  
%Table 2 
Btilda=reshape(IRFelas(:,1,findex),4,4);  %recovering identification 
matrix 
%variance decomp 
VDC=zeros(15,4); 
VDCrpoil=zeros(15,4); 
  for h=1:15; 
      [VC, K]=VARdecomp(BETAnc,Btilda,h); 
      %inventory change is fourth variable 
      VDC(h,:)=VC(4,:); 
      VDCrpoil(h,:)=VC(3,:); 
  end; 
  
  [VC, K]=VARdecomp(BETAnc,Btilda,600); 
  VDCinf=VC(4,:) 
  VDCinfrpoil=VC(3,:) 
 
Figure 1 
%obtain relevant IRF 
IRF=IRFelas(:,:,findex); 
%obtain IRFs from the Posterior draws 
load BayesPosterior; 
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time=(0:1:xmax); 
CI=prctile(IRMposs,[16 84],3); 
CI1458912=prctile(cumsum(IRMposs,2),[16 84],3); 
CI([1 4 5 8 9 12],:)=CI1458912([1 4 5 8 9 12],:); 
  
CI5=prctile(IRMposs,[2.5 97.5],3); 
CI5_1458912=prctile(cumsum(IRMposs,2),[2.5 97.5],3); 
CI5([1 4 5 8 9 12],:)=CI5_1458912([1 4 5 8 9 12],:); 
  
  
figure; 
set(gcf,'name',['Figure 1']) 
set(gcf,'NumberTitle','off') 
  
subplot(3,4,1); %row 1 
plot(time,-cumsum(IRF(1,:)),'r',time,-(CI(1,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(1,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2);          
title('Flow supply shock') 
ylabel('Oil production') 
line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
axis([0 xmax -2 1]) 
hold off; 
  
subplot(3,4,2); 
    plot(time,-IRF(2,:),'r',time,-(CI(2,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(2,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
  
subplot(3,4,3); 
    plot(time,-IRF(3,:),'r',time,-(CI(3,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(3,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
  
subplot(3,4,4); 
    plot(time,-cumsum(IRF(4,:)),'r',time,-(CI(4,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(4,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;  
     
 subplot(3,4,5); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(5,:)),'r',time,(CI(5,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(5,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Oil production') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -1 2]); 
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    hold off;  
  
 subplot(3,4,6); 
    plot(time,IRF(6,:),'r',time,(CI(6,:,1)),'b--',time,(CI(6,:,2)),'b-
-','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
  
subplot(3,4,7); 
    plot(time,IRF(7,:),'r',time,(CI(7,:,1)),'b--',time,(CI(7,:,2)),'b-
-','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;      
     
 subplot(3,4,8); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(8,:)),'r',time,(CI(8,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(8,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;         
     
 subplot(3,4,9); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(9,:)),'r',time,(CI(9,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(9,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Oil production') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -1 2]); 
    hold off;  
     
subplot(3,4,10); 
    plot(time,IRF(10,:),'r',time,(CI(10,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(10,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;   
     
 subplot(3,4,11); 
   plot(time,IRF(11,:),'r',time,(CI(11,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(11,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
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  subplot(3,4,12); 
   plot(time,cumsum(IRF(12,:)),'r',time,(CI(12,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(12,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;     
   
  
Figure 2 
dentMat=reshape(IRFelas(:,1,findex),4,4); 
Uhat=U; 
p=24; 
t=308; t=length(kmData) 
[K, q]=size(IdentMat); 
% Compute structural multipliers 
A=  [BETAnc; eye(K*(p-1),K*(p-1)), zeros(K*(p-1),K)]; 
J=[eye(K,K) zeros(K,K*(p-1))]; 
IRF=reshape(J*A^0*J'*IdentMat,K^2,1); 
  
for i=1:t-p-1 
    IRF=([IRF reshape(J*A^i*J'*IdentMat,K^2,1)]); 
end; 
  
  
  
% Compute structural shocks Ehat from reduced form shocks Uhat 
Ehat=inv(IdentMat)*Uhat(1:q,:); 
  
% Cross-multiply the weights for the effect of a given shock on the 
real 
% oil price (given by the relevant row of IRF) with the structural 
shock 
% in question 
yhat1=zeros(t-p,1); yhat2=zeros(t-p,1); yhat3=zeros(t-p,1); 
yhat4=zeros(t-p,1); 
for i=1:t-p 
    yhat1(i,:)=dot(IRF(3,1:i),Ehat(1,i:-1:1)); 
    yhat2(i,:)=dot(IRF(7,1:i),Ehat(2,i:-1:1)); 
    yhat3(i,:)=dot(IRF(11,1:i),Ehat(3,i:-1:1));   
    yhat4(i,:)=dot(IRF(15,1:i),Ehat(4,i:-1:1));   
end; 
  
time=(1983+5/12+1/12*p):1/12:2008+12/12; %starts at 1983.5 
  
  
cumshock=yhat1+yhat2+yhat3+yhat4;   
  
  
figure; 
subplot(3,1,1) 
plot(time,yhat1,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Flow Supply Shock on Real Price of Crude 
Oil') 
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axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
  
subplot(3,1,2) 
plot(time,yhat2,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Flow Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude 
Oil') 
axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
plot(time,yhat3,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Speculative Demand Shock on Real Price of 
Crude Oil') 
axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
  
  
MATLAB Code for Oil Inventories Adapted to Time Frame - (1983.4 -
2008.12) 
Bays Draws 
 
%Bayes draws for reduced form parameters of the VAR. 
  
close all; 
clc; 
clear; 
  
global xmax 
  
load kmData 
  
load worldprod 
ProdMBPM=worldprod(2:end)*30/1000; 
OECDCrudeDif=kmData(:,4); 
  
xmax=17;    %horizon 
jmax=1000000;  %number of draws for sign restrictions 
rdraws=50;   %posterior draws 
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randn('state',1112)% seed 
  
tic; 
[IRFposs 
]=BAYESsign(kmData,xmax,4,24,rdraws,jmax,ProdMBPM,OECDCrudeDif); 
%save IRFpossBayes IRFposs  
%load IRFpossBayes 
toc; 
  
%saving for constructing error bands 
IRMposs=IRFposs; 
save BayesPosterior IRMposs 
%for use in Main.m (Figure 1) 
  
[j k l] = size(IRFposs); 
  
elasuse=zeros(1,l); 
elasprod=zeros(l,1); 
for i=1:l; 
    IRprod=IRFposs(1,1,i); IRinv=IRFposs(4,1,i); 
IRprice=IRFposs(3,1,i); 
    FlowNew=ProdMBPM*(1+IRprod/100)-mean(OECDCrudeDif)-IRinv; 
    Flow=ProdMBPM-mean(OECDCrudeDif); 
    PctChange=100*(FlowNew-Flow)./Flow; 
    ElasUseSeries=PctChange/IRprice; 
    elasuse(i)=mean(ElasUseSeries); 
    elasprod(i)=IRFposs(1,1,i)./IRFposs(3,1,i); 
end; 
  
%obtain the median elasticity in use 
 medelasuse=median(elasuse) 
    save medelasuse medelasuse; %called by Main.m 
  
elasusepctile=prctile(elasuse,[16 50 84]) 
elasprodpctile=prctile(elasprod,[16 50 84]) 
  
std(elasusepctile) 
std(elasprodpctile) 
 
Main 
close all; 
clc; 
clear; 
  
global xmax 
  
load kmData 
% percent change in global oil production, real activity index from 
Kilian(AER 2009), the log real price of oil, and changes in OECD crude 
oil inventories 
  
[BETAnc,B,X, SIGMA, U, V]=lsvarcSA(kmData,24); 
  
xmax=17; 
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jmax=500000; 
randn('state',316) 
[IRFaer, K]=VARirf(BETAnc,SIGMA,xmax); 
  
  
[IRFposs]=IRFsign(BETAnc,SIGMA,xmax,jmax); 
  
  
[j k l] = size(IRFposs); 
  
load worldprod 
ProdMBPM=worldprod(2:end)*30/1000; 
OECDCrudeDif=kmData(:,4); 
  
  
%imposing additional restrictions 
  
index=1; 
IRFelas=zeros(4^2,xmax+1);  %will be populated with the admissible 
IRFs 
elasticity=IRFposs(9,1,:)./IRFposs(11,1,:);  %supply elasticity in 
response to speculative demand shock 
ADelas=IRFposs(5,1,:)./IRFposs(7,1,:);  %supply elasticity in response 
to flow demand shock 
elasuse=0; 
format short 
for i=1:l; 
    %%elas in use 
    IRprod=IRFposs(1,1,i); IRinv=IRFposs(4,1,i); 
IRprice=IRFposs(3,1,i); 
    FlowNew=ProdMBPM*(1+IRprod/100)-mean(OECDCrudeDif)-IRinv; 
    Flow=ProdMBPM-mean(OECDCrudeDif); 
    PctChange=100*(FlowNew-Flow)./Flow; 
    ElasUseSeries=PctChange/IRprice; 
    if elasticity(i)<=.0258 && ADelas(i)<=.0258  && 
mean(ElasUseSeries)<=0    && min(cumsum(IRFposs(1,1:12,i)))>=0 && 
min(IRFposs(2,1:12,i))>=0 && max(IRFposs(3,1:12,i))<=0 ; 
        IRFelas(:,:,index)=IRFposs(:,:,i); %admissible IRFs 
        elasuse(index)=mean(ElasUseSeries);  %elasticity in use 
        index=index+1; 
    end; 
   
end; 
  
load medelasuse 
%median of posterior is -.26 
distance=abs(elasuse-medelasuse); 
%find index of IRF with elasuse closest to -.26 
[mindist, findex]=min(distance)   
  
%Figure 1 
Figure1 
  
%Figure 2 
Figure2 
  
%Figures 3 through 7 
Figures3to7; 
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%Table 2 
Btilda=reshape(IRFelas(:,1,findex),4,4);  %recovering identification 
matrix 
%variance decomp 
VDC=zeros(15,4); 
VDCrpoil=zeros(15,4); 
  for h=1:15; 
      [VC, K]=VARdecomp(BETAnc,Btilda,h); 
      %inventory change is fourth variable 
      VDC(h,:)=VC(4,:); 
      VDCrpoil(h,:)=VC(3,:); 
  end; 
  
  [VC, K]=VARdecomp(BETAnc,Btilda,600); 
  VDCinf=VC(4,:) 
  VDCinfrpoil=VC(3,:) 
Figure 1 
 
%obtain relevant IRF 
IRF=IRFelas(:,:,findex); 
%obtain IRFs from the Posterior draws 
load BayesPosterior; 
  
time=(0:1:xmax); 
CI=prctile(IRMposs,[16 84],3); 
CI1458912=prctile(cumsum(IRMposs,2),[16 84],3); 
CI([1 4 5 8 9 12],:)=CI1458912([1 4 5 8 9 12],:); 
  
CI5=prctile(IRMposs,[2.5 97.5],3); 
CI5_1458912=prctile(cumsum(IRMposs,2),[2.5 97.5],3); 
CI5([1 4 5 8 9 12],:)=CI5_1458912([1 4 5 8 9 12],:); 
  
  
figure; 
set(gcf,'name',['Figure 1']) 
set(gcf,'NumberTitle','off') 
  
subplot(3,4,1); %row 1 
plot(time,-cumsum(IRF(1,:)),'r',time,-(CI(1,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(1,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2);          
title('Flow supply shock') 
ylabel('Oil production') 
line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
axis([0 xmax -2 1]) 
hold off; 
  
subplot(3,4,2); 
    plot(time,-IRF(2,:),'r',time,-(CI(2,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(2,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
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subplot(3,4,3); 
    plot(time,-IRF(3,:),'r',time,-(CI(3,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(3,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
  
subplot(3,4,4); 
    plot(time,-cumsum(IRF(4,:)),'r',time,-(CI(4,:,1)),'b--',time,-
(CI(4,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow supply shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;  
     
 subplot(3,4,5); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(5,:)),'r',time,(CI(5,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(5,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Oil production') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -1 2]); 
    hold off;  
  
 subplot(3,4,6); 
    plot(time,IRF(6,:),'r',time,(CI(6,:,1)),'b--',time,(CI(6,:,2)),'b-
-','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
  
subplot(3,4,7); 
    plot(time,IRF(7,:),'r',time,(CI(7,:,1)),'b--',time,(CI(7,:,2)),'b-
-','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;      
     
 subplot(3,4,8); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(8,:)),'r',time,(CI(8,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(8,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Flow demand shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;         
     
 subplot(3,4,9); 
    plot(time,cumsum(IRF(9,:)),'r',time,(CI(9,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(9,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Oil production') 
Does Speculation Affect Oil Price Volatility? 
 
43 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -1 2]); 
    hold off;  
     
subplot(3,4,10); 
    plot(time,IRF(10,:),'r',time,(CI(10,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(10,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real activity') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;   
     
 subplot(3,4,11); 
   plot(time,IRF(11,:),'r',time,(CI(11,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(11,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Real price of oil') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -5 10]); 
    hold off;  
     
  subplot(3,4,12); 
   plot(time,cumsum(IRF(12,:)),'r',time,(CI(12,:,1)),'b--
',time,(CI(12,:,2)),'b--','linewidth',2); 
    title('Speculative demand shock') 
    ylabel('Inventories') 
    xlabel('Months') 
    line([0 xmax], [0 0],'linewidth',2) 
    axis([0 xmax -20 20]); 
    hold off;     
   
Figure 2 
dentMat=reshape(IRFelas(:,1,findex),4,4); 
Uhat=U; 
p=24; 
t=308; t=length(kmData) 
[K, q]=size(IdentMat); 
% Compute structural multipliers 
A=  [BETAnc; eye(K*(p-1),K*(p-1)), zeros(K*(p-1),K)]; 
J=[eye(K,K) zeros(K,K*(p-1))]; 
IRF=reshape(J*A^0*J'*IdentMat,K^2,1); 
  
for i=1:t-p-1 
    IRF=([IRF reshape(J*A^i*J'*IdentMat,K^2,1)]); 
end; 
  
  
  
% Compute structural shocks Ehat from reduced form shocks Uhat 
Ehat=inv(IdentMat)*Uhat(1:q,:); 
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% Cross-multiply the weights for the effect of a given shock on the 
real 
% oil price (given by the relevant row of IRF) with the structural 
shock 
% in question 
yhat1=zeros(t-p,1); yhat2=zeros(t-p,1); yhat3=zeros(t-p,1); 
yhat4=zeros(t-p,1); 
for i=1:t-p 
    yhat1(i,:)=dot(IRF(3,1:i),Ehat(1,i:-1:1)); 
    yhat2(i,:)=dot(IRF(7,1:i),Ehat(2,i:-1:1)); 
    yhat3(i,:)=dot(IRF(11,1:i),Ehat(3,i:-1:1));   
    yhat4(i,:)=dot(IRF(15,1:i),Ehat(4,i:-1:1));   
end; 
  
time=(1983+5/12+1/12*p):1/12:2008+12/12; %starts at 1983.5 
  
  
cumshock=yhat1+yhat2+yhat3+yhat4;   
  
  
 
 
figure; 
subplot(3,1,1) 
plot(time,yhat1,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Flow Supply Shock on Real Price of Crude 
Oil') 
axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
  
subplot(3,1,2) 
plot(time,yhat2,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Flow Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude 
Oil') 
axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
plot(time,yhat3,'b-','linewidth',2); 
title('Cumulative Effect of Speculative Demand Shock on Real Price of 
Crude Oil') 
axis([1978+6/12 2009+8/12 -100 +100]) 
line([(1990+7/12) (1990+7/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1978+9/12) (1978+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1980+9/12) (1980+9/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(2002+11/12) (2002+11/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
line([(1985+12/12) (1985+12/12)], [-100 100],'linewidth',2) 
grid on 
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Annex 
Descripetive  Statistics 
Oil Production 
 
Oil Production 
  
Mean 0,1150 
Standard Error 0,0713 
Median 0,1399 
Mode  
Standard Deviation 1,2511 
Sample Variance 1,5652 
Kurtosis 6,2577 
Skewness -0,8318 
Range 11,6091 
Minimum -7,0825 
Maximum 4,5266 
Sum 35,4210 
Count 308,0000 
Largest(1) 4,5266 
Smallest(1) -7,0825 
Confidence Level (95,0%) 0,1403 
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Real Activity  
 
Real Activity 
  
Mean -4,7287 
Standard Error 1,3193 
Median -8,8944 
Mode  
Standard Deviation 23,1531 
Sample Variance 536,0646 
Kurtosis 0,1641 
Skewness 0,6979 
Range 113,4625 
Minimum -57,2989 
Maximum 56,1636 
Sum -1456,4537 
Count 308,0000 
Largest(1) 56,1636 
Smallest(1) -57,2989 
Confidence Level (95,0%) 2,5960 
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Real Price of Oil 
 
Real Price of Oil 
  
Mean -15,2146 
Standard Error 2,4932 
Median -26,4604 
Mode  
Standard Deviation 43,7551 
Sample Variance 1914,5055 
Kurtosis 0,0017 
Skewness 0,5754 
Range 232,5600 
Minimum -117,5350 
Maximum 115,0250 
Sum -4686,1059 
Count 308,0000 
Largest(1) 115,0250 
Smallest(1) -117,5350 
Confidence Level (95,0%) 4,9059 
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Spread 
 
Spread 
  
Mean 0,03762 
Standard Error 0,38961 
Median 0,50896 
Mode  
Standard Deviation 6,83762 
Sample Variance 46,75300 
Kurtosis 4,69461 
Skewness 0,29541 
Range 71,94331 
Minimum -33,27884 
Maximum 38,66447 
Sum 11,58766 
Count 308,00000 
Largest(1) 38,66447 
Smallest(1) -33,27884 
Confidence Level (95,0%) 0,76664 
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Inventory 
 
Inventory 
  
Mean 3,1113 
Standard Error 1,3358 
Median 2,0060 
Mode  
Standard Deviation 23,4438 
Sample Variance 549,6118 
Kurtosis 0,1512 
Skewness 0,2433 
Range 138,7404 
Minimum -60,2651 
Maximum 78,4753 
Sum 958,2950 
Count 308,0000 
Largest(1) 78,4753 
Smallest(1) -60,2651 
Confidence Level (95,0%) 2,6286 
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